

AO 91 (Rev. 11/11) Criminal Complaint

AUSA: April Russo  
Special Agent: Adam ChristensenTelephone: (313) 226-9129  
Telephone: (313) 965-2323

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
for the  
Eastern District of Michigan

14

United States of America  
v.  
Danny Esteban Berrocal Fuentes

Case: 2:18-mj-30633  
Assigned To : Unassigned  
Assign. Date : 12/10/2018  
Description: SEALED MATTER (SO)

**CRIMINAL COMPLAINT**

I, the complainant in this case, state that the following is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

On or about the date(s) of 2013 to on or about October of 2017 in the county of Oakland and Elsewhere in the  
Eastern District of Michigan, the defendant(s) violated:

*Code Section*

Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e); 2252A(a)(2)  
(A) and (b)(1); 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2); 2422,  
and 2252A(g)(2).

*Offense Description*

Producing, attempting to produce, and conspiracy to produce child  
pornography; receipt and distribution of, conspiracy to receive and distribute,  
and attempt to receive and distribute child pornography; possession of,  
knowing access, conspiracy to access, or attempted access with intent to view  
child pornography; coercion and enticement; participating in a child  
exploitation enterprise.

This criminal complaint is based on these facts:

See attached AFFIDAVIT.

☒ Continued on the attached sheet.

Sworn to before me and signed in my presence.

**DEC 10 2018**

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

City and state: Detroit, Michigan

  
Complainant's signature

Adam Christensen, Special Agent (FBI)  
Printed name and title

  
Judge's signature

Hon. R. Steven Whalen, U.S. Magistrate Judge  
Printed name and title

**AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR COMPLAINT AND  
ARREST WARRANT**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

I, Adam Christensen, having been first duly sworn, do hereby depose and state as follows:

1. I have been employed as a Special Agent of the FBI since 2010, and am currently assigned to the Detroit Division. While employed by the FBI, I have investigated federal criminal violations related to child exploitation, and child pornography. I have gained experience through training and everyday work relating to conducting these types of investigations. I have received training in the area of child pornography and child exploitation, and have had the opportunity to observe and review numerous examples of child pornography (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256) in all forms of media including computer media. Moreover, I am a federal law enforcement officer who is engaged in enforcing the criminal laws, including 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 and 2252A, and I am authorized by the Attorney General to request an arrest warrant.

2. This affidavit is made in support of an application for a criminal complaint and arrest warrant for **Danny Esteban Berrocal Fuentes** (date of birth 12/05/1991) for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e) (producing, attempting to produce, and conspiracy to produce child pornography); 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A)

and (b)(1) (receipt and distribution of, conspiracy to receive and distribute, and attempt to receive and distribute child pornography); 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2) (possession of, knowing access, conspiracy to access, or attempted access with intent to view child pornography); 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (coercion and enticement); and 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g)(2) (participating in a child exploitation enterprise).

3. The statements contained in this affidavit are based in part on: information provided by other law enforcement agents and officials; written reports about this and other investigations that I have received, directly or indirectly, from other law enforcement agents; information gathered from the service of administrative subpoenas; the results of physical and electronic surveillance conducted by law enforcement agents; independent investigation and analysis by FBI agents/analysts and computer forensic professionals; and my experience, training and background as a Special Agent (SA) with the FBI. Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of securing authorization for the requested arrest warrant, I have not included each and every fact known to me concerning this investigation. Instead, I have set forth only the facts that I believe are necessary to establish probable cause that **Berrocal Fuentes** has violated Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e), 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1), 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2), 2422, and 2252A(g)(2).

### **Background of Investigation**

4. This affidavit, complaint, and arrest warrant are part of an ongoing investigation related to the sexual exploitation of children (specifically minor preteen and teenage girls) on a chatroom-based website. To protect the integrity of the investigation, the website will be referred to throughout this affidavit as Website A.

5. Website A is a social media platform where people, using usernames of their choosing, enter chatrooms and communicate with other users in real time. The chatrooms have a list of users in the lower right corner of the screen, an active chat conversation on the lower left corner of the screen, and a large space above these for individuals to live stream their activities via web camera. In each chatroom, at any given time, up to two users can broadcast their activities via web camera.

6. The investigation reveals that Website A is primarily used by adult men seeking to sexually exploit teenage and preteen girls. These men pretend to be teenage boys, teenage girls, or others to entice the victims to engage in sexually explicit activity on camera. Throughout the course of this investigation, the FBI has identified more than 100 minor victims, with dozens more yet unidentified, who remove clothing, engage in sexual activity, and otherwise pose for other users on the various chatrooms on Website A. The investigation also reveals that in many instances groups of users on Website A work together to coordinate the recruitment, enticement, and coercion of the

victims into producing child pornography.

***Minor Victim-1's Victimization***

7. On June 29, 2017, MV-1 (DOB XX/XX/2000), a resident of the Eastern District of Michigan, was forensically interviewed by the FBI. During the interview, MV-1 stated that she had consistently been on Website A in a room with four to five individuals that she believed to be teenage males. This group of individuals enticed MV-1 to display her naked body and, among other things, to show her bottom and touch her vagina while on webcam on Website A. She stated that the group members also asked her to engage in sexual activity with her brother and to insert objects into her vagina, but that she never did those things.

8. The FBI reviewed logs from Website A to determine the identity of the offenders who enticed MV-1 to engage in sexual activity on webcam. These logs show, among other things, the IP addresses utilized to login to specific chatrooms, the date of the logins, and the names of those chatrooms. By reviewing the logs for MV-1's IP address, the FBI discovered that numerous individuals, including offender S2,<sup>1</sup> consistently visited a chatroom on Website A with MV-1 on at least a dozen different occasions.

---

<sup>1</sup> The FBI knows the identities of S2, Website A, Website B, and the true usernames utilized by the defendants (including the username of **COSTA RICA TARGET #1** discussed below), but they are not revealed here to protect the integrity of an ongoing investigation.

***S2's Arrest and Cooperation Regarding the Group***

9. On July 27, 2017, after the FBI executed a federal search warrant at his residence, S2 agreed to speak to law enforcement. S2 identified MV-1 and stated that he had enticed her to visit Website A so that she could be targeted for sexual exploitation by a group of Website A users with whom he was working. The objective of the group was to entice minor females to undress, masturbate, and engage in other types of sexual activity on web camera on Website A. S2 stated that he had been working with this particular group on Website A since 2012 or 2013 through the summer of 2017.<sup>2</sup>

10. S2 identified the target age of the victims of this group as 15-17 year old females. Members of the group usually recorded these sexual acts and sometimes shared the recordings with other group members. S2 stated that he and other group members were typically on the website targeting minors multiple times per week. He admitted that he had personally recorded dozens of minor females engaged in sexual activity on Website A. In addition to MV-1, S2 identified several other minors, to

---

<sup>2</sup> S2 acknowledged being a part of a second group as well. Eight United States-based members of that group (including S2) were arrested, indicted for their participation in a child exploitation enterprise, and are currently detained in the Eastern District of Michigan. All eight of those individuals, including S2, have entered guilty pleas to one count of child exploitation enterprise (18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(g)(2)). Six have been sentenced to sentences ranging from 32 years to 41 years' imprisonment. To date, over 1,000 child pornography videos have been recovered from S2's devices, numerous of which he recorded from Website A.

include MV-2 and MV-3, as victims of the group. These minors were all victimized on multiple occasions.

11. From S2's statements and a review of social media conversations between S2 and members of this second group, I know that this group used certain terminology. For example, they used the term "hunt" to refer to searching for minor female targets, the term "win" to refer to successfully getting a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct on webcam, the term "cap" or "capture" to refer to their recordings of minors, and the term "bate" as an abbreviation for masturbate. They used a minus symbol and a number to signify how much younger than 18 their victims were (e.g., -3 means 15 years old, -4 means 14 years old, etc.).

12. They also had their own roles or positions. For example, "talkers" in the group were in charge of talking to the girls to get them to engage in sexual activity. "Hunters" were in charge of getting the girls on to Website A and alerting other group members to the fact that they had brought the minors to Website A. The "loopers" would play a previously recorded video of a different minor chatting and/or performing sexual acts in a chatroom. The "looper" pretended to be the minor depicted in the video that is broadcast to the targeted minor victim as if it is occurring in real-time.

13. According to S2, from 2012 or 2013 through April of 2017, the group organized themselves on Website B. Website B contained a password-protected

spreadsheet where the group maintained a list of minor females that they were targeting and what rooms on Website A were associated with them, along with a link to the social media account that had been used to target the minor female. It also included a chat function so that the group members could chat as they coordinated their activities on Website A. In April 2017, the group stopped using Website B and picked up their group conversations on the social media platform Discord.

14. S2 told the FBI the names of several members of the group, identifying them only by their username or usernames used on Website A, Website B, and/or Discord. Group members typically used the same usernames across these platforms, although some had more than one username.

15. S2 provided consent to search his Discord account. Reviewing the group's chats on the Discord server supported S2's statements. Specifically, the Discord group chat had the same name as the group had used on Website B. Likewise, the group members involved in the Discord chat included numerous usernames that S2 had identified as group members. The chat conversations started on April 29, 2017, and went through October of 2017. The content of the group's discussions (i.e., about girls, rehashing activity on Website A, recalling conversations on Website B, etc.) corroborated statements made by S2.



16. In these conversations, group members posted sexually explicit images of girls, links to Website A chatrooms, talked about “perving,” discussed “hunting” and “win,” referenced MV-2 (who the investigation has revealed has a DOB in 2001) and MV-3 (who the investigation has revealed has a DOB in 2002), discussed girls who were on camera in Website A rooms, and discussed sexual activity that girls had engaged in or were engaging in (e.g. “she was showing pussy”; “she used to dance in thong and bra on periscope, but never showed”; “1k show tits.”). In short, the discussions over Discord corroborated S2’s statements and MV-1’s statements about a group of users on Website A targeting teenage girls for sexual exploitation. So far, nine of the group members (including S2 and S3 (discussed below)) have been convicted of child exploitation enterprise in the Eastern District of Michigan. Their sentences ranged from 30 to 40 years’ imprisonment. Thousands of child pornography images and videos were recovered from their devices, including videos that one or more group members produced that meet the federal definition of child pornography of MV-1, MV-2, and MV-3. Each of these minors is depicted masturbating on web camera in more than one of the recovered videos.

***Group Member COSTA RICA TARGET #1***

17. S2 identified user **COSTA RICA TARGET #1** as being a member of his group on Website A. According to S2, **COSTA RICA TARGET #1** was primarily a

talker for the group and spoke Spanish and would infrequently bring minor females to Website A to be enticed by the group. S2 was shown a photograph taken from the Kik account associated with **COSTA RICA TARGET #1**. S2 believed this to be the person who used the username **COSTA RICA TARGET #1**, but from a younger age. S2 stated that **COSTA RICA TARGET #1** was younger than many of the group members and would occasionally go on web camera as himself, as opposed to using a loop, in order to target minor females. S2 believed that **COSTA RICA TARGET #1** resided in central America, most likely in Costa Rica.

18. **COSTA RICA TARGET #1** was also active in the group's Discord chat. He was involved in discussions about the group's effort to recruit minor females from other social media sites.

19. Moreover, the FBI has arrested and detained several other members of the group discussed throughout this affidavit. Several of those group members have identified **COSTA RICA TARGET #1** as a member of the group, including many identifying him as a significant member. One of the arrested individuals had several chats involving, or about, victims of the group saved to his computer. **COSTA RICA TARGET #1** appeared in several of those chats discussing group activity on Website A.

***COSTA RICA TARGET #1 is Danny Esteban Berrocal Fuentes***

20. Your affiant determined that an account on the website MyLOL.com, which is a website designed to facilitate dating for teenagers and was commonly used by this group and others utilizing Website A for hunting minor females, was associated with **COSTA RICA TARGET #1**. This MyLOL account was in communication with MyLOL accounts associated with S2 and others from the group, as well as with MV-2. MyLOL.com was subpoenaed for subscriber information for this account and the return information, which was received on July 25, 2017, listed the date of birth of the user as 12/05/1997.<sup>3</sup> The IP addresses used to login to the account all geolocated to Costa Rica.

21. As mentioned above, **COSTA RICA TARGET #1** was also involved in the group's private Discord conversation. The Discord account associated with **COSTA RICA TARGET #1** was subpoenaed for subscriber information in September 2017. On October 5, 2017, Discord returned subscriber information which showed the email address used to sign up for the account was pXXXXXX@hotmail.com. The IP addresses used to login to the account were all geolocated to Costa Rica.

---

<sup>3</sup> A person with a DOB in 1991 could not have obtained a MyLOL account in 2015 without lying about their age because that person would be over the age of 19 at that time. MyLOL requires its users to be between the ages of 13 and 19 at the time they sign up for their account.

22. On November 8, 2018, one of the victims of the group, MV-5 (who was targeted when she was a minor)<sup>4</sup>, with date of birth in 1995, stated that she was still in communication with one of the group members who she identified as having a username of **COSTA RICA TARGET #1**. She stated that **COSTA RICA TARGET #1** traveled to the United States occasionally and had requested to meet her in person on more than one occasion. She provided his Instagram account which showed his display name as **COSTA RICA TARGET #1**. On the Instagram page, there were images of the user of the account, including the same photograph used for the profile picture of the Kik account associated with **COSTA RICA TARGET #1** which had been shown to S2 and identified as **COSTA RICA TARGET #1** by S2. A Wordpress website was linked on the Instagram page. The website contained a set of poems posted between 2011 and 2018. Each of these poems were copyrighted by **Danny Berrocal**.

23. A search of FBI databases found a Visa application for **Danny Esteban Berrocal Fuentes** with date of birth 12/05/1991. The photograph in the application depicted the same individual as the person depicted in the images of the user of the

---

<sup>4</sup> Multiple sexually explicit images and videos were recovered of MV-5 from group members' devices, including videos where she is in her bra or underwear. However, none of these met the federal definition of child pornography. Group member S3 identified her as a group victim and stated that she was 13 or 14 when she came to the group. S3 specifically remembered another group member trying to get her to do something sexual on web camera, but he said he never actually saw her engage in the activity on that date or any other date.

Instagram account that MV-5 had identified as belonging to **COSTA RICA TARGET #1**. The date of birth matched the month and day for the MyLOL.com account associated with **COSTA RICA TARGET #1** discussed above. The email address provided by **Berrocal Fuentes** was pXXXXXX@hotmail.com, the same email address used by **COSTA RICA TARGET #1** on the associated Discord account discussed above.

**CONCLUSION**

24. Based on the foregoing, there is probable cause to believe **Danny Esteban Berrocal Fuentes** has produced, attempted to produce, and conspired to produce child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e). There is also probable cause to believe that **Berrocal Fuentes** coerced and enticed, or attempted to coerce and entice, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422; and has participated in a child pornography enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g)(2).



Special Agent Adam Christensen  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Sworn to me this 10th day of December, 2018



R. Steven Whalen  
United States Magistrate Judge